Sounding the Canon: How Judges Use Canonical Literary Citations to Bolster the Authority of Natural Rights Jurisprudence by Braff, William E.
Sounding the Canon: How Judges Use Canonical 
Literary Citations to Bolster the Authority of 
Natural Rights Jurisprudence  
WILLIAM E. BRAFF* 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION: MUCH ADO ABOUT SOMETHING ............................ 2 
II. A CANON BY ANY OTHER NAME: DEFINING THE WESTERN CANON 
AND OBSERVING ITS ROLE IN JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING ............ 4 
A. Such Stuff as Dreams Are Made On: The Content and 
Contours of Canons .................................................................. 5 
B. All Ye Know on Earth, and All Ye Need to Know: Examining 
Literary Citations in Judicial Opinions .................................... 8 
III. FROM CONSUBSTANTIAL TO INSUBSTANTIAL: THE EFFECT OF 
DECLINING AMERICAN RELIGIOSITY ON NATURAL LAW AND 
NATURAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE ON THE AMERICAN JUDICIARY 
           .......................................................................................................11 
A. Nature Never Did Betray / The Heart That Loved Her: A Brief 
Exploration of Natural Law, Natural Rights, Religion, and 
American Legal Philosophy .................................................... 12 
B. Look Upon My Works Ye Mighty and Despair: The Impact of 
Diminishing American Religion on Natural Law Opinions .... 15 
IV. MAKING A HEAVEN OF A HELL: JUDICIAL CITATIONS OF THE 
CANON THAT AUTHORIZE NATURAL LAW OPINIONS IN A SECULAR 
WORLD .......................................................................................... 16 
A. What a Grace Was Seated on This Brow: A Study of the 
Literary Thread in Judge Willett’s Patel Concurrence .......... 17 
B. A Mix’d Essence: Natural Law and the Double Nature of 
Rhetoric and Formation in Judicial Opinions ........................ 19 
C. More Things in Heaven and Earth / Than Are Dreamt of in 
Your Philosophy: How Canonical Literature Addresses the 
Authority Problem in a Secular Era ....................................... 21 
                                                                                                                 
 * Executive Articles Editor, Ohio State Law Journal; Juris Doctor Candidate, May 
2019, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law; Bachelor of Arts, Kenyon 
College, May 2013. Special thanks to Professor Steven F. Huefner for patiently guiding my 
research and reflection on this topic, to Professor Pamela K. Jensen, Professor Fred E. 
Baumann and the Kenyon College Department of Political Science for providing a 
foundational education that has enriched my professional and personal development in 
countless ways, and to my parents, Todd and Wendy Braff, for their unwavering support in 
all my pursuits. Finally, thanks to staff of the Ohio State Law Journal for their invaluable 
work throughout the publication process. 
2 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL Furthermore 
V. COME YOU SPIRITS, UNSEX ME HERE: CONSIDERING THE CRITICAL 
RACE AND GENDER CRITIQUE OF THE WESTERN CANON AS 
HARMFULLY EXCLUSIONARY ........................................................ 22 
I. INTRODUCTION: MUCH ADO ABOUT SOMETHING 
If one were to ask readers of a legal opinion what, exactly, composes the 
document they are reading, such readers might echo Hamlet, glibly replying 
“[w]ords, words, words.”1 And they would not be wrong. Judicial opinions 
function as a collection of written words that define, apply, or overrule 
existing law. However, a discerning legal reader might inquire about the 
authority that gives clout to words in judicial opinions. This question is crucial 
because if judges have no enhanced or special authority regarding language, 
then judicial opinions risk being unable to persuade a democratic society that 
courts issue valid law.2 As an unelected branch, the judiciary faces a higher 
burden to satisfy the American electorate, particularly when judicial opinions 
draw on uncodified natural law or natural rights principles.3  
Considering that judicial opinions either enforce laws or invalidate laws as 
illegitimate, judicial citations to literature may puzzle legal readers or seem 
like superfluous dicta.4 Indeed, Justice Cardozo begins Law and Literature 
with the statement, “I am told at times by friends that a judicial opinion has no 
business to be literature,” and continues, “[a] commoner attitude with lawyers 
is one, not of active opposition [to literature], but of amused or cynical 
indifference.”5 It is true that literature carries no formal legal authority. For 
instance, a defense attorney’s citation of Macbeth to establish her client’s 
insanity defense in a murder trial would be sheer absurdity, if not malpractice.  
                                                                                                                 
  1 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 2, sc. 2. 
  2 Ray Forrester, Supreme Court Opinions—Style and Substance: An Appeal for 
Reform, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 167, 173 (1995) (“Under the American version of the Rule of 
Law, judicial opinions serve the function of explaining and justifying the exercise of power 
case by case. Within our system of judicial supremacy, written opinions become the 
judicial concession to democracy—to the exercise of elitist power over a mass of 
consenting subjects.”).  
  3 See Garrett Epps, Clarence Thomas is in the Wrong Line of Work, THE ATLANTIC 
(Mar. 7, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/03/clarence-thomas-
thinks-he-knows-best/584263/ [https://perma.cc/Z8RK-G5EN] (“But a judge is not God, 
just a public employee elected by nobody. Judges who don’t limit their ambitions 
accordingly betray the oath .  .  .  A judge’s job is to apply that precedent to new facts—and 
explain convincingly why a given result flows from it, or why courts should in this case 
break with it.”). 
  4 See David A. Skeel, Jr., Lawrence Joseph and Law and Literature, 77 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 921, 925 (2009) (chronicling how modern legal education “drove a wedge between 
law and literature”).  
  5 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, LAW AND LITERATURE (1931), reprinted in CARDOZO ON 
THE LAW 3–4 (1982).  
Spring 2018] SOUNDING THE CANON 3 
Nonetheless, judicial citations to canonical authors, from Shakespeare, to 
Dickens, to Yeats, to Vonnegut have persisted into the twenty-first century.6 
Indeed, Justice Scalia holds the mantle of being the most literary Supreme 
Court Justice in American history, at least in terms of citation to canonical 
authors.7 The frequent literary allusions and citations that populate judicial 
opinions should lead the careful student of the law to ask if and why literary 
language is important when employed by judges.  
This legal reader can reach two possible conclusions: either (1) 
invocations of canonical literature are ornamental or (2) literary references 
play a substantive role in judicial opinions.8 Rephrased, references to 
canonical literature are either something or nothing. This Article concedes that 
literary allusions may sometimes be used by some judges in an ornamental 
function, e.g., to grab the reader’s attention or to simply reference a judge’s 
favorite author. However, this Article argues that literary allusions play a 
pivotal role in informing and influencing judicial opinions. Judges, in their 
official capacity, write about the law, society, justice, and American liberal 
democracy. Because judicial opinions have a direct effect on American laws 
and mores, a legal audience ought to take judges seriously when the bench 
grounds arguments in literature and uses precious space in opinions to direct 
the reader to a canonical literary text.9 In short, judicial usage of canonical 
literary citations can and should be interpreted as a phenomenon that 
substantially impacts the theory and practice of American law, as opposed to 
mere ornamentation or rhetorical flourish. 
This Article contends that citations to the Western literary canon are 
particularly important to judges who draw upon a natural rights or natural law 
framework. Part II of this Article will briefly summarize the content and 
history of the Western canon. The Western canon is comprised of unusually 
insightful commentators on the human condition, meaning there is a kinship 
between canonical literature and natural law because both purport to be 
grounded in universal truths discoverable by reason. Part III explores the 
impact of secularization on American judges in issuing opinions amenable to 
natural law and natural rights jurisprudence. As revelation began to falter as a 
commonly accepted justification for natural rights or natural law, judges with a 
natural rights or natural law perspective faced a crisis of authority in which to 
                                                                                                                 
  6 See infra Part II.B. 
  7 See Ami A. Dodson & Scott Dodson, Was Antonin Scalia the Most Literary 
Supreme Court Justice?, LITERARY HUB (Feb. 15, 2016), http://lithub.com/was-antonin-
scalia-the-most-literary-supreme-court-justice/ [https://perma.cc/98RB-376V] (chronicling 
literary cites by Supreme Court Justice). 
  8 See William Domnarski, Shakespeare in the Law, 67 CONN. B.J. 317, 327 (1993) 
(distinguishing between ornamental and substantive citations of Shakespeare in judicial 
opinions). 
  9 For example, a federal district court in New Jersey “found direction in the last 
stanza” of William Butler Yeats’s poem “Among School Children.” Freeman v. Fischer, 
Civ. Action No. 03–3140 (KSH), 2012 WL 12902914, at *13 (D.N.J. Aug. 30, 2012). 
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ground their opinions. Part IV argues that the Western canon filled this 
authority vacuum by providing a commonly accepted fount of wisdom, i.e., 
literature. This project succeeded because insights found in the Western canon 
make natural law or natural rights jurisprudence more palatable to citizens. 
Part V concludes by surveying challenges to the Western canon as 
exclusionary of historically marginalized perspectives and exploring how the 
concept of a canon survives historicist claims that foundational literary texts 
function as oppressive relics penned by dead white European men.  
Importantly, this Article identifies natural law and the Western canon as 
kindred concepts. Both allege to offer timeless wisdom that can guide human 
flourishing and are thus similarly rigid;10 a legal principle or social more 
cannot easily enter the canon or be considered a tenet of natural law. Absent 
belief in the bedrock notion that there is an enduring wisdom or justice outside 
of positive law or social constructs, both natural law and the Western canon 
lose their authoritative weight. Although natural law and the Western canon 
exist outside the bounds of positive law, such unwritten principles play a vital, 
substantive role in legitimizing judicial opinions.  
II. A CANON BY ANY OTHER NAME: DEFINING THE WESTERN CANON 
AND OBSERVING ITS ROLE IN JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 
The canon surrounds us. From Barnes and Noble classics, to allusions in 
popular culture, to ubiquitous phrases such as Dante’s “abandon hope all ye 
enter here” or Melville’s “call me Ishmael,” we can observe a pervasive belief 
that a collection of shared texts exists in Western, or at least American, 
culture.11 This Part will first briefly explore the concept of canons and then 
conclude by observing how judges cite the canon in judicial opinions.  
                                                                                                                 
  10 See Harvey Mansfield, How to Understand Politics: What the Humanities Can 
Say to Science, FIRST THINGS (Aug. 2007), 
https://www.firstthings.com/article/2007/08/004-how-to-understand-politics 
[https://perma.cc/2PPS-Z7C5] Mansfield first defends the value of literature because 
“[s]cience is unable to reach the major part of humanity except by providing us with its 
obvious benefits. Literature takes on the big questions of human life that science 
ignores[.]” Mansfield then champions the study of “the greatest names” in the humanities 
because “[h]uman greatness is the height of human importance, where the best that humans 
can do is tested, and it is the work of great individuals.” Taken together, these statements 
demonstrate that the study of the greatest literary minds is essentially a quest for truth. This 
reflects John Finnis’s description of natural law as investigating “the basic forms of human 
flourishing [that] are obvious to anyone acquainted, whether through his or her own 
inclinations or vicariously through the character and works of others, with the range of 
human opportunities.” JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 371 (2d ed. 
2011). 
  11 See Michael Pantazakos, Ad Humanitatem Pertinent: A Personal Reflection on 
the History and Purpose of the Law and Literature Movement, 7 CARDOZO STUD. L. & 
LITERATURE 31, 41–43 (1995) (outlining the responses of various schools of thought to the 
existence of the western literary canon). 
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A. Such Stuff as Dreams Are Made On: The Content and Contours of 
Canons 
Perhaps the simplest definition of the Western canon is the collection of 
texts that, as Judge Posner pithily remarks, “count as literature.”12 But this 
answer raises the equally fundamental question of who is doing the counting. 
Is it English professors? Cultural elites? The present democratic citizenry? 
Esteemed minds from the past? Like Odysseus, the prototypical literary 
protagonist, the very concept of the canon inheres of twists and turns.13 To 
begin answering these questions, this Article first turns to Allan Bloom’s 
treatment of the cultural revolution of the 1960s, when Western Civilization 
courses were criticized and began to curry disfavor in the American 
academy.14 Published in 1987, Bloom’s Closing of the American Mind became 
a surprise bestseller, perhaps reflecting an underlying American 
acknowledgement that the acceptance or rejection of a canon plays a key role 
in maintaining American society and the laws that govern it.15 Bloom’s 
castigation of American universities for abandoning the classical curriculum 
persists into contemporary debates over the pedagogical aims of law schools.16 
Bloom contends that the modern American university, unmoored from 
justifying its curriculum on traditional canonical education, “offers no 
distinctive visage to the young person . . . [i]n short there is no vision, nor is 
there a set of competing visions, of what an educated human being is.”17 In 
other words, Bloom argues that American students are no longer developed in 
a teleological fashion towards being a cultured citizen because our society 
lacks a “particular view of the educated or civilized man as authoritative.”18 
Bloom traces this alleged decline in American higher education to a 
                                                                                                                 
  12 See Richard A. Posner, Judges’ Writing Styles (And Do They Matter?), 62 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1421, 1424 (1995).  
  13 While this Article’s treatment of the canon is careful to distinguish between core 
concepts like the canon’s existence as a whole and the parts that make up this canon, 
exhausting the complexities of canonical formation and perpetuation is beyond the scope of 
this Article. 
  14 See generally Gilbert Allardyce, The Rise and Fall of the Western Civilization 
Course, 87 AM. HIST. REV. 695 (1982) (discussing the development of the Western 
Civilization course and the factors that led to its demise in many institutions). 
  15 See Donald Lazere, ‘The Closing of the American Mind,’ 20 Years Later, INSIDE 
HIGHER ED (Sept. 18, 2007), https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2007/09/18/closing-
american-mind-20-years-later, [https://perma.cc/GH96-EVZC]. 
  16 See Steven Lubet, Closed Minds and American Law Schools?, 75 CORNELL L. 
REV. 949, 952 (1990) (defending Bloom’s position that abandoning the traditional 
curriculum weakened higher education in America). 
  17 ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND 337 (1987). 
  18 Id. at 338. 
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diminished acceptance of Western civilization as the guide to enlightenment 
and society’s corresponding rejection of the great books curriculum.19  
Liberal education, according to Bloom, “means reading certain generally 
recognized classic texts.”20 These texts reflect “the first principles with which 
we interpret the world” and “prepare[] the way for the discussion of a unified 
view of nature and man’s place in it, which the best minds debated on the 
highest level.”21 For Bloom, the Western canon is a repository of instructive 
knowledge and insights that allows Western citizens to communicate with 
each other in a shared moral language.22  
An education in the Western canon, what Allan Bloom and Leo Strauss 
refer to as a liberal education,23 aims at preparing young people for 
citizenship. Noting the etymological kinship between the English word 
“culture”, the Latin word cultura, and “agriculture,” Leo Strauss underscores 
how the phenomenon of culture intimately relates to the development of 
human beings in a definitive, as opposed to a relativistic, manner.24 It is only 
through “constant intercourse with the greatest minds,” according to Strauss, 
that a human being can become developed or cultured.25 In short, the Western 
canon functions as a didactic tool wielded by human beings to distinguish 
wisdom from mere opinion, or at least to give educated citizens a common 
tongue for such inquiries.26 By engaging with the greatest minds, the ones who 
crafted and refined the first principles of Western society, a student can 
experience a process akin to the teleological development described by 
Aristotle in the Politics.27  
Such a robust concept of a Western canon is not without its critics. Harold 
Bloom, in his famous attempt to catalogue, or at least outline, the contents of 
the canon, notes that “[t]hose who oppose the [c]anon insist that there is 
always an ideology involved in canon formation; indeed, they go farther and 
speak of the ideology of canon formation, suggesting that to make a canon (or 
                                                                                                                 
  19 Id. at 339 (describing the college curriculum as a carnival barker attempting to 
lure students into sideshows, but ultimately unable to offer a coherent and whole 
education). 
  20 Id. at 344. 
  21 Id. at 346–47. 
  22 Id. (arguing that the most important facet of the Great Books curriculum is a 
shared experience in approaching big picture, universal questions).  
  23 See BLOOM, supra note 17, at 44; Leo Strauss, What Is Liberal Education?, 
DITEXT.COM (June 6, 1959), http://www.ditext.com/strauss/liberal.html 
[https://perma.cc/2PFW-MP5C]. 
  24 Strauss, supra note 23. 
  25 Id. 
  26 See BLOOM, supra note 17, at 344. 
  27 Aristotle contends, “[f]or what each thing is when fully developed, we call its 
nature .  .  .  the final cause and end of a thing is the best.” This leads Aristotle to assert 
that, “man, when perfected, is the best of animals.” GEORGE C. CHRISTIE & PATRICK H. 
MARTIN, JURISPRUDENCE: TEXT AND READINGS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 41 (3d ed. 
2008). 
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to perpetuate one) is an ideological act in itself.”28 In other words, there exists 
a popular cynicism that claims that the canon elevates certain works to cement 
or promote power structures. Such cynicism casts doubt upon the mere 
possibility of a canon, asserting the impossibility of objective claims that a 
certain text or writer should be categorized as great. Opponents of Bloom 
therefore argue that the canon has been wielded to entrench the interests and 
values of wealthy Western white men and make the relativist claim that no text 
is, by virtue of wisdom or aesthetics, categorically better than another.29 These 
arguments attempt to erode the alleged role of the canon as reinforcing 
traditional power structures by invoking the absurd image of a single person 
declaring that each possible text is or is not canonical.30 Indeed, the canon 
looks rather foolish when one imagines drawing a line between which 
Hemingway short stories are canonical or figuring out exactly which authors 
to include from a given period. Rephrased, it is undeniably unfeasible to ask 
scholars or readers to compare the canonicity of twentieth century British 
novelists like Kingsley Amis, Evelyn Waugh, J.R.R. Tolkien, Virginia Woolf, 
and Anthony Powell, not to say anything of comparing them to Austen, 
Chaucer, or Dickens (and all of that must be done before even moving past the 
British Isles or even considering poets or playwrights). 
Despite arguments challenging the concept of a canon, we may still claim 
some literary works are more reputable or valuable than others. For example, it 
is intuitively objectionable to place popular novels like Fifty Shades of Gray 
and Twilight on equal footing with Shakespeare, Tolstoy, and Joyce.31 
Although Harold Bloom’s functional description of the canon as “what has 
been preserved out of what has been written”32 would alleviate this tension, it 
still seems unsatisfactory to believe the preservation of certain texts has been 
                                                                                                                 
  28 HAROLD BLOOM, THE WESTERN CANON: THE BOOKS AND SCHOOL OF THE AGES 
22 (1994). 
  29 DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL 
ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW 15 (1997) (“An approach sometimes labeled 
‘deconstruction’ has swept through universities, altering the landscape in discipline after 
discipline. The goal of the deconstructionist is to expose, or deconstruct, the underlying 
subjectivity and indeterminacy of everything we thought we knew. Radical 
multiculturalists adopt this approach, attempting to deconstruct such fundamental concepts 
as truth, merit, and law.”). The authors go on to critique legal realism and critical legal 
studies as teaching that “legal principles are infinitely flexible and decisions depend on 
what the judge had for breakfast.” Id. at 18. Such movements are a dangerous corrosive to 
the belief that “[a]t least since the Enlightenment, knowledge has been thought of as 
universally accessible and objective” and that “[s]omething counts as knowledge not 
because of its pedigree but because of its content.” Id. at 27. 
  30 See id. at 25–26. 
  31 MOD. LANGUAGE ASS’N, REPORT TO THE TEAGLE FOUNDATION ON THE 
UNDERGRADUATE MAJOR IN LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE 6 (Feb. 2009), 
https://apps.mla.org/pdf/2008_mla_whitepaper.pdf [http://perma.cc/B85J-WD9V] 
(recognizing the existence of literary masterpieces and the importance of exposing students 
to such works). 
  32 See BLOOM, supra note 28, at 17. 
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independent from artistic merit. Even viewing the selection of canonical texts 
as a free-market process concedes that popularity, and not merit, defines the 
canon. As with biological evolution, the enduring appeal of certain ideas and 
texts from one generation to the next cannot be coincidental, arbitrary, or 
accidental.  
B. All Ye Know on Earth, and All Ye Need to Know: Examining Literary 
Citations in Judicial Opinions 
Considering the connection between the Western canon and the 
development of cultured citizens discussed in the above Part, it should be no 
surprise that judges invoke canonical texts in their opinions. Indeed, Judge 
Posner remarks, “[j]udges can obtain insights from literature that have nothing 
to do with effective presentation or persuasion but have rather to do with the 
spirit, meaning, or values found in literature, and so in a rough sense with 
content rather than just form.”33 For instance, Justice Scalia refers to the works 
of Kafka, Carroll, Orwell, and Vonnegut in a single paragraph while dissenting 
in PGA v. Martin.34 Even more impactful, the infamous “all deliberate 
speed”35 clause in Chief Justice Warren’s Brown v. Board decision sprung 
from Francis Thompson’s poem “Hound of Heaven.”36 The operative legal 
phrase that shaped implementation of the Supreme Court’s desegregation 
imperative, in fact, originated in poetry.37  
Justices Scalia and Warren are not rogue members of the judiciary in their 
citing of canonical literature. Indeed, American courts have cited Shakespeare 
alone almost 800 unique times in official opinions.38 The law and literature 
movement claims that these literary citations possess meaning because 
“reading fiction can provide judges with knowledge about how to solve real 
world problems.”39 For example, Judge Brann begins his opinion in 
Mifflinburg Telegraph, Inc. v. Criswell with an invocation of Dostoyevsky, 
particularly the psychological manifestations of guilt when dealing with state 
authorities.40 Referring to “physical actions and reactions that demonstrate 
                                                                                                                 
  33 RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 299 
(1988). 
  34 PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 US 661, 705 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
  35 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).  
  36 Jim Chen, Poetic Justice, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 581, 583 (2006). 
  37 Id.  
  38 See Domnarski, supra note 8, at 319. 
  39 M. Todd Henderson, Citing Fiction, 11 GREEN BAG 2D 171, 172 (2008). 
  40 Mifflinburg Telegraph, Inc. v. Criswell, 277 F. Supp. 3d 750, 757 (M.D. Pa. 
2017) (“‘In all literature, there is perhaps no more vivid example of a man wrestling with 
the knowledge of his own guilt than that of Raskolnikov in [Fyodor] Dostoyevsky’s Crime 
and Punishment.’ ‘Throughout Crime and Punishment, Dostoyevsky provides examples of 
physical actions and reactions that demonstrate Raskolnikov’s consciousness of his 
guilt . . . such as Raskolnikov’s psychosomatic illness and his internal 
monologue.’ . . . Here, there is no murder. But there was stealing. Although the matter 
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Raskolnikov’s consciousness of his guilt” in Crime and Punishment, Judge 
Brann establishes a framework for analyzing the mendacity of the defendant 
who violated the Pennsylvania Uniform Trade Secrets Act.41 In a case 
determined by evaluating the veracity of the defendant, Judge Brann invoked 
Dostoyevsky’s treatment of the psychological effects of guilt.42 Ultimately, the 
opinion in Mifflinburg Telegraph channels a canonical literary exploration of 
guilty conscience to create a binding legal decision.  
Although the law and literature movement identifies a kinship between 
literary texts and legal texts, there is a wide range of opinions on the degree 
and nature of this relationship. The most cautious observers simply posit that 
encountering great books leads to improved writing and critical thinking skills, 
but do not believe that literature can answer substantive questions of law.43 
From that perspective, literature simply improves a legal writer’s 
understanding of good prose and a quote from the canon might suffice as a 
rhetorical flourish. Other commentators find a deeper connection between law 
and literature in narrative structure, as the compelling stories told by literature 
instruct legal writers how to weave yarns that favor their client.44 Yet legal 
scholars like Richard Weisberg and Martha Nussbaum go a step further, 
arguing that literature can produce a substantive impact on judges, i.e., that 
canonical literature may influence the morality and rationality incumbent in 
judicial decision making.45 For instance, the Fifth Circuit’s understanding of 
corporate management in Deus v. Allstate grounded itself in two works of 
canonical drama, Arthur Miller’s Death of a Salesman and David Mamet’s 
Glengarry Glen Ross.46 Scholars like Weisburg and Nussbaum contend such 
                                                                                                                 
turns on the undisputed facts of this case, Defendant Heidi Criswell’s pro 
se representations, written in the third person as if to distance herself from her own actions, 
are an admixture of consciousness of guilt and an attempt to convince the Court of her 
unbelievable naivety, leading me to the ineluctable conclusion based on the record of this 
matter that, despite her vociferous protestations to the contrary, there is a distinct absence 
of mistake here.”). 
  41 Id. at 757, 799. 
  42 Id. at 757. 
  43 See, e.g., Daniel J. Kornstein, A Practicing Lawyer Looks Back on Law and 
Literature, 10 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LITERATURE 117, 117–18 (1998) (examining why 
practicing lawyers do not read and reflect on “books and plays” to bolster their 
understanding of the law). 
  44 See Skeel, supra note 4, at 928 (referring to “legal storytelling” as a “branch of 
[the] law and literature [movement]” and discussing Derrick Bell and Patricia Williams—
pioneers in this area—who “crafted their own first-person accounts of race and gender 
discrimination”). 
  45 See James Seaton, Law and Literature: Works, Criticism, and Theory, 11 YALE 
J.L. & HUMAN. 479, 479–91 (1999) (discussing the views of Weisberg and Nussbaum on 
the relationship between law and literature and comparing their views with other legal 
scholars). 
  46 Deus v. Allstate Ins. Co., 15 F.3d 506, 514 (5th Cir. 1994) (“The tragic heroism 
of Willy Loman in THE DEATH OF A SALESMEN and the furious sales competition of David 
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literary references are not merely rhetorical flourishes, but actually guide 
judicial understanding, or at least judicial explanation, of human interactions 
in a substantive manner.47  
The contribution of canonical literary works to judicial treatment of justice 
and society extends far beyond mere rhetoric. Indeed, the teachings embedded 
in canonical literary texts provide lessons to judges that Weisburg finds 
necessary “to revitalize the ethical component of law” and guide our 
jurisprudence to its “humane roots.”48 Because literature instructs the 
underlying ethical considerations required by justice, Weisburg offers “the 
literary text as a potential gold mine of knowledge about law.”49 Accordingly, 
Weisburg argues “[t]here is a reason why, these days, lawyers are furthering 
the return to the Great Books. We feel—perhaps more keenly than do the 
literature professors—the risks of having another generation lost to these 
sources of .  .  .  professional and human wisdom.”50 If literature offers 
substantive instruction to judges, then the Western canon is the most fecund 
source of insight. 
This connection between law and literature impacts judges in particular. 
Nussbaum argues for the superiority of the “literary judge” over judges who 
are not informed by literature.51 She begins with the contention that “the law is 
a humanistic as well as a scientific field, and that its excellences include the 
special excellence of practical reasoning as they are understood in the 
humanities.”52 Therefore “the literary judge,” or the judge guided by literary 
insights, “will not tailor her principles to the demands of political or religious 
pressure groups” because such a judge “does not gush with irrelevant or 
ungrounded sentiment” and is able to “examine [social] realities searchingly, 
with imaginative concreteness.”53 Literary knowledge therefore affords a 
judge both neutrality and empathy that commingle to create an objective sense 
of wisdom and judiciousness. But, even more so, literature “provides insights 
that should play a role .  .  .  in the construction of an adequate moral and 
political theory.”54 Justice Breyer illuminates this concept in the following 
excerpt from his confirmation hearing:  
I was reading something by Chesterton, and he was talking about one of the 
Brontes, I think her Jane Eyre. He says you go and look out at the city—I 
                                                                                                                 
Mamet’s GLENGARRY GLEN ROSS suggest that salesmen such as Deus [the Plaintiff] come 
to tolerate management pressures that many would consider to be beyond the pale.”). 
  47 See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE: THE LITERARY IMAGINATION AND 
PUBLIC LIFE (1995); RICHARD WEISBERG, POETHICS: AND OTHER STRATEGIES OF LAW AND 
LITERATURE (1992). 
  48 WEISBERG, supra note 47, at 35, 46. 
  49 Id. at 34. 
  50 Id. at 122. 
  51 NUSSBAUM, supra note 47, at 82. 
  52 Id. at 86. 
  53 Id.  
  54 Id. at 12 
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think he was looking at London—and he said you know, you see all those 
houses now, even at the end of the nineteenth century, and they all look as if 
they’re the same. And you think all those people are out there going to work 
and they’re all the same. He says, but what Bronte tells you is they’re not the 
same. Each one of those persons in each one of those houses and each one of 
those families is different, and they each have a story to tell. Each of those 
stories involves something about human passion. Each of those stories 
involves a man, a woman, children, families, work, lives—and you get that 
sense out of the book. And so sometimes I’ve found literature very helpful as 
a way out of the tower.55 
Justice Breyer’s invocation of Chesterton and Bronte demonstrates the 
profound impact of canonical literature on judicial visions of society, justice, 
and the legal system. Considering Justice Breyer’s statements along with the 
above judicial opinions and scholarship, significant evidence demonstrates that 
judges can and do view literature as an instructive, and not a merely rhetorical, 
tool.  
III. FROM CONSUBSTANTIAL TO INSUBSTANTIAL: THE EFFECT OF 
DECLINING AMERICAN RELIGIOSITY ON NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL 
RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE ON THE AMERICAN JUDICIARY 
Judicial reliance on canonical literature suggests that the insights of 
canonical authors have not been preserved on an arbitrary basis, but have 
endured as viable touchstones for fundamental legal and moral questions.56 
Even if great literary minds conflict, their teachings equip readers with 
compelling and competing alternatives to answer serious questions, e.g., what 
is the best human life, what is the relation of God and man, is the good life its 
own reward, are human beings capable of free will or blameworthy for their 
actions, etc.57 A belief in absolute, as opposed to relative, answers to these 
questions links canonical literature and natural law jurisprudence. This Part 
explores the kinship between natural law and the Western canon. Additionally, 
this Part argues that the secularization of society weakened the traditional 
authority of natural law jurisprudence and thereby created an authority 
vacuum.  
                                                                                                                 
  55 Id. at 79. 
  56 See supra Part II.B. 
  57 See ITALO CALVINO, WHY READ THE CLASSICS? 8 (1999) (describing the present 
as “noise outside our window, warning us of the traffic jams and weather changes outside” 
when compared to “the discourse of the classics which resounds clearly and articulately 
inside our room”).  
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A. Nature Never Did Betray / The Heart that Loved Her: A Brief 
Exploration of Natural Law, Natural Rights, Religion and American 
Legal Philosophy 
  Beginning at least with the scholarship of Thomas Aquinas, natural 
law and religion have been intertwined.58 If a higher code of law exists beyond 
the positive legal writings of a particular culture at a particular historical 
moment, religion would be an obvious source of such law. Laws predating 
man or derived from a higher, potentially inaccessible source could easily be 
described as revelation.59  
However, revelation is not the sole path to natural law or natural rights. 
Many legal philosophers contend that natural law can be discerned by use of 
reason. When Ronald Dworkin addresses the proposition “that citizens have 
rights apart from what the law happens to give them,”60 he permits the 
existence of an external repository of rights outside of those written in 
constitutions and revised codes. Framed differently, the question becomes 
whether “an American ever [has] the right, in strong a sense, to do something 
which is against the law[.]”61 If a citizen has a moral right not codified in 
existing law, he or she must be using a standard wholly separate from positive 
law.  
Illuminating the objective standard inherent in natural law, Professor 
Hadley Arkes opines that natural law begins “with an understanding of the 
things that [are] higher and lower in human nature.”62 Starting with the 
premise that certain rights, ideas, or truths can be evaluated objectively by the 
use of human reason, the concept of natural law unfolds as a result of this 
evaluative process. Whereas positive law is made, natural law is found.63 
Because ideas and laws are evaluated on an objective, natural standard, such a 
standard can be used to challenge the justice or wisdom of existing positive 
law.64 Therefore, the diversity of laws and customs among peoples, and the 
                                                                                                                 
  58 See, e.g., J. Budziszewski, Natural Law Revealed, FIRST THINGS (Dec. 2008), 
https://www.firstthings.com/article/2008/12/natural-law-revealed [https://perma.cc/FR5B-
Z2HH].  
  59 Id. 
  60 RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 184 (Harvard Univ. Press 1977). 
  61 Id. at 190.  
  62 HADLEY ARKES, CONSTITUTIONAL ILLUSIONS AND ANCHORING TRUTHS: THE 
TOUCHSTONE OF THE NATURAL LAW 44 (2010). 
  63 See Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Natural Law and the Right to Property, 4 NAT. 
L. INST. PROC. 45, 50–51 (1951) (taking a position against “the legal positivists who claim 
to see only ‘the pure fact of law,’ existing completely independent of, indeed, entirely apart 
from moral ideas and principles, [who] have no doubt looked down their noses at what they 
regard as this twaddle about natural law”).  
  64 LEO STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY 92 (1953) (“Nature is older than 
any tradition; hence it is more venerable than any tradition. The view that natural things 
have a higher dignity than things produced by men is based not on any surreptitious or 
unconscious borrowings from myth, or on residues of myth, but on the discovery of nature 
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contradictions and disagreements between them, can be traced to an 
“insufficient grasp of natural right.”65 If judges are to follow a natural law or 
natural rights jurisprudence, then there will likely be scenarios when morality, 
as conceived by natural law principles, conflicts with positive law.  
Judicial invocation of natural law and natural rights in issuing legal 
decisions does not escape criticism.66 As the source of this law is not often 
identifiable or accessible to the general public, judges who employ natural law 
reasoning must take great care to avoid allegations of judicial activism 
usurping the democratic legislative process.67 The unelected nature of 
American judges stokes suspicion when judicial opinions rely on natural rights 
explanations to alter or invalidate legislatively enacted laws crafted by 
democratic means.68 For instance, scholars critique the Lochner era because it 
“endowed the Constitution with the Justices’ own ideas of natural law.”69 
Additionally, the Warren Court faces routine criticism for reading rights into 
the constitution to achieve political ends.70 When judges appeal to extralegal 
arguments, or arguments driven by principle and not legislative text, their 
opinions are often decried as activist, no doubt because of the democratic 
                                                                                                                 
itself .  .  .  By uprooting the authority of the ancestral, philosophy recognizes that nature is 
the authority.”). 
  65 Id. at 100.  
  66 See, e.g., Eduardo M. Peñalver, Restoring the Right Constitution?, 116 YALE L.J. 
732, 764 (2007) (“Some people will no doubt worry that the danger that natural law 
methodology will engender an untethered judicial activism makes even a progressive 
natural law constitutionalism unattractive.”). 
  67 See Steven G. Calabresi, The Originalist and Normative Case Against Judicial 
Activism: A Reply to Professor Randy Barnett, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1081, 1096–97 (2005). 
  68 Ronald Dworkin argues that, because codified law is not “the exclusive source of 
[moral] rights,” judges often have to approach the law with principles found outside 
statutes and constitutions. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 16 (1985). For 
instance, “[a] judge who follows the rights conception of the rule of law will try, in a hard 
case, to frame some principle that strikes him as capturing, at the appropriate level of 
abstraction, the moral rights of the parties.” Id. at 17. The use of natural rights to inform 
judicial rulings made on principle appears to the academic community and democratic 
citizens as a facile way to cloak political decisions, which are inappropriate for judges who 
merely interpret the law. See id. at 10–11. 
  69 Morton J. Horwitz, The Warren Court and the Pursuit of Justice, 50 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 5, 6 (1993).  
  70 David Luban, The Warren Court and the Concept of a Right, 34 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 7, 7 (1999). (“The Warren Court is dead. None of its Justices remain on the 
bench—indeed, only Justice White survives—and the recent history of the Supreme Court 
has been in large part a history of repudiating controversial Warren Court doctrines. Public 
opinion likewise repudiates Warren-style judicial activism, and constitutional 
scholarship—which as recently as the mid-1980s consisted in considerable measure of 
theoretical defenses for Warren Court-inspired methods of interpreting the Bill of Rights—
has grown increasingly skeptical of expansive interpretive strategies.”). 
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skepticism towards a system of allegedly neutral judges divining truths 
unobservable to ordinary citizens and legislators.71  
This democratic suspicion against using natural law or natural rights in 
judicial opinions creates a problem of authority for natural law jurisprudence 
in judicial chambers.72 Our society has moved away from the Lochner era 
conception that “took as natural and inviolate a system that was legally 
constructed and took the status quo as the foundation from which to measure 
neutrality.”73 Accordingly, invocation of reason as ultimate authority for 
natural law risks failing because many individuals may claim their 
interpretation of the law is justified by impartial reason. As there is no readily 
available omniscient intermediary to evaluate claims based on an objective, 
natural standard, competing claims of natural law would create chaos and not 
clarity.74 
 Considering the compulsion for judges to base natural law opinions in 
acceptable authority, it is no surprise that religion played a major role in early 
American legal thought. Indeed, the famous natural rights declaration that 
“[w]e hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that 
they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights” is quite 
literally the first expression of American legal philosophy.75 American 
independence, and the legal system the Founders had in mind, grounded itself 
in natural rights given to human beings by God.76 In short, our Republic was 
founded on the comingling of natural law and religion.77  
                                                                                                                 
  71 See generally Eric Dean Hageman, Note, Judicial Candor and Extralegal 
Reasoning: Why Extralegal Reasons Require Legal Justifications (And No More), 91 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 405, 406 (2015) (identifying the tension between extralegal 
reasoning and preservation of the judiciary’s legitimacy).  
  72 This skepticism can be summed up by the following line of questioning: “If 
natural law exists, what is in it? Is it a blank slate on which anyone may write subjective 
beliefs? Does it include religious dogmas? If so, of what religions?” See Anthony Murray, 
When Judges Believe in ‘Natural Law’, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 27, 2014), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/01/when-judges-believe-in-natural-
law/283311/ [https://perma.cc/R57T-CK9L]. 
  73 Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 882 (1987).  
  74 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40, 40 (1918) 
(“If . . . the truth may be defined as the system of my (intellectual) limitations, what gives 
it objectivity is the fact that I find my fellow man to a greater or less extent (never wholly) 
subject to the same Can’t Helps.”). 
  75 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added).  
  76 See generally George W. Carey, Natural Rights, Equality, and the Declaration 
of Independence, 3 AVE MARIA L. REV. 45 (2005) (discussing the underpinnings of the 
Declaration of Independence, including theories on natural rights). 
  77 See generally Kody W. Cooper & Justin Buckley Dyer, Thomas Jefferson, 
Nature’s God, and the Theological Foundations of Natural-Rights Republicanism, 10 POL. 
& RELIGION 662 (2017) (discussing theological influences on the Declaration of 
Independence). 
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B. Look Upon My Works Ye Mighty and Despair: The Impact of 
Diminishing American Religion on Natural Law Opinions  
American skepticism of theology as the path to justice brought about a 
concomitant doubt over judicial reliance on natural rights and natural law. 
Judges, along with scholars, have found it difficult to formulate “how to 
defend the notion of rights in an age when theological derivations of rights 
from divine law or even from what used to be called ‘natural law’ were likely 
to be divisive from the start.”78 As compared to the Founding Era, 
Christianity’s hold on American society has suffered a decline in influence.79 
Charles Lugosi asserts that the last century of legal history has been defined by 
a creep of secularism.80 In his view, the “divine law is part of American 
jurisprudence” but has been reduced to a “fossilized heritage” in recent 
years.81 Accordingly, a substantial percentage of Americans no longer believe 
that positive law can be evaluated on an external, divine standard.82 For 
Lugosi, natural law has “theological roots” and thus faces pushback from an 
American public trending towards agnosticism and atheism.83 In an 
increasingly secular society, citizens come to view law as merely “an arbitrary 
and capricious device” instead of a “derivation of eternal principles.”84 This 
historical movement away from the religiosity that undergirded natural rights 
doctrine at the American founding created an infertile soil for natural law 
jurisprudence.85  
The impact of changing American religious beliefs on natural law cannot 
be understated. Joyce A. Little observes “religion and morality were 
recognized to make absolute claims upon us . . . [while] [p]olitics, on the other 
                                                                                                                 
  78 JEFFREY ABRAMSON, MINERVA’S OWL: THE TRADITION OF WESTERN POLITICAL 
THOUGHT 323 (2009). 
  79 America’s Changing Religious Landscape, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (May 12, 2015) 
http://www.pewforum.org/2015/05/12/americas-changing-religious-landscape/ 
[https://perma.cc/B2JV-9E3V] (observing widespread decline in American Christianity in 
the twenty-first century).  
  80 See Charles I. Lugosi, The Rejection of Divine Law in American Jurisprudence: 
The Ten Commandments, Trivia, and the Stars and Stripes, 83 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 
641, 641–42 (2006). 
  81 Id. at 652. 
  82 America’s Changing Religious Landscape, supra note 79 (showing an eight 
percent decrease in American Christians between 2007 and 2014, as well as a six percent 
increase in religiously unaffiliated Americans).  
  83 Lugosi, supra note 80, at 655. 
  84 Robert J. Cosgrove, Damned to the Inferno? A New Vision of Lawyers at the 
Dawning of the Millennium, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1669, 1689 (1999).  
  85 Keith Whitaker, The God Killer, CLAREMONT REVIEW OF BOOKS (Feb. 8, 2018), 
https://www.claremont.org/crb/article/the-god-killer/ [https://perma.cc/9JBE-UQBF] 
(observing that the death of God described by Nietzsche indicates that religious “demise is 
the very conclusion of the modern natural right tradition” because “there is no objective 
ground for right[.]”). 
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hand, was understood to have a relative value . . . [t]oday, these things are 
reversed.”86 In other words, Little suggests Americans no longer believe in an 
external or fixed standard for evaluating good and bad, or just and unjust, 
actions. Because “[n]o God exists apart from whatever concepts of him we 
might cobble up, no moral demands are made on us beyond those we choose, 
or do not choose, to make.”87 The decline of American religion brought about 
a resulting doubt concerning the existence of an objective moral standard, 
which is the bedrock of natural law.  
Because of a diminished faith in objective external standards and 
principles that supersede written law, the authority problem for judges 
amenable to natural law jurisprudence has become increasingly difficult to 
overcome. In a secular era where religion cannot provide a societal framework 
for categorizing certain acts or laws as objectively good or bad, and not simply 
illegal or legal, American natural law jurisprudence finds barren terrain to 
cultivate legal theory based on unwritten external standards.88  
This decline in religion produced “value-neutral” technicians who cannot 
speak to the hearts and minds of citizens.89 For a judge with natural law 
inclinations, this creates difficulties for persuading the public that the court’s 
opinions are based in legitimate authority. Because such “hostility to[wards] 
religion is fairly new,” having developed “in the middle of the last century,” 
judicial chambers, or at least judges friendly to natural law, are still searching 
for a means of justifying natural law jurisprudence to a citizenry 
“losing .  .  .  the traditional values that lie at the heart of our civilization.”90 
This Article contends that citation to canonical literary works helps solve this 
authority problem that generates hostility towards natural law jurisprudence in 
an increasingly secular society.  
IV. MAKING A HEAVEN OF A HELL: JUDICIAL CITATIONS OF THE CANON 
THAT AUTHORIZE NATURAL LAW OPINIONS IN A SECULAR WORLD 
Considering the authority problem faced by judges espousing natural law 
in an era of increasing secularism, this Part asserts that literary citations, 
particularly canonical literary citations, can fill the authority void for natural 
law judicial authority. This Part will begin with a case study of Judge Willett’s 
                                                                                                                 
  86 Joyce A. Little, Christianity and the Spirit of the Age, in TOWARD THE RENEWAL 
OF CIVILIZATION 27 (T. William Boxx & Gary M. Quinlivan eds., 1998). 
  87 Id. at 32.  
  88 See Larry Arnn, What We Can Know: Natural Law Properly Understood, THE 
AMERICAN MIND, https://americanmind.org/features/academias-disease/what-we-can-
know-natural-law-properly-understood/ [https://perma.cc/CGD6-3YHZ] (outlining the 
corrosive effects of relativism and historicism in the American educational system, 
particularly when subverting the natural law tradition). 
  89 Cosgrove, supra note 84, at 1681. 
  90 Robert H. Bork, Courts and the Culture Wars, in COURTS AND THE CULTURE 
WARS 10–11 (Bradley C.S. Watson ed., 2002).  
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concurrence in Patel v. Texas Dept. of Licensing. Patel demonstrates a robust 
natural law defense of economic liberty by employing a panoply of canonical 
literary citations. Accordingly, this Part argues that using the Western canon to 
justify natural law decisions is not merely an ornamental or rhetorical choice, 
but adds substantial authority to judicial holdings. In conclusion, this Part 
considers whether literary citation makes natural law palatable for certain 
types of legal readers or if it instructs judges in identifying natural law 
principles.  
A. What a Grace Was Seated on This Brow: A Study of the Literary 
Thread in Judge Willett’s Patel Concurrence 
In an eye-raising move, Judge Willett wrote in favor of exempting a 
commercial eyebrow threading business from strict licensing laws because 
“liberty is not provided by government; liberty preexists government. It is not 
a gift from the sovereign; it is our natural birthright. Fixed. Innate. 
Unalienable.”91 By presenting economic liberty as a right preexisting positive 
law, Judge Willet’s opinion suggests that natural law is the correct 
jurisprudential lens for determining whether regulation is too burdensome 
when weighed against the natural right to “earn an honest living.”92  
To bolster his natural law claims, Judge Willett makes two literary moves. 
First, he contends, “[i]nvalidating irrational laws does not beckon a Dickensian 
world of run-amok frauds and pretenders.”93 Second, Judge Willett invokes 
Shakespeare when explaining the judicial ability to overturn legislation 
“irrationally subjugating the livelihoods” of citizens, quoting the Merchant of 
Venice, “You take my house when you do take the prop / That doth sustain my 
house; you take my life / When you do take the means whereby I live.”94 Both 
quotes authorize the judicial power to overturn democratically enacted laws by 
invoking the authority of an unwritten higher principle of economic livelihood. 
The first quote employs Dickensian morality characters to distinguish judges 
from thieves, knaves, and crooks who subvert the law for their own gain. 
Further distancing judges from “quacks, swindlers, and incompetents,” Judge 
Willett’s citation of Shakespeare reveals the fundamental principle that 
deprivation of economic liberty can be equated to deprivation of a home.95 In 
Patel, these literary references play a crucial role of explaining the judicial 
authority to overturn laws and the inherent justice of protecting economic 
liberty.  
Judge Willett frames his concurrence with two propositions: we live in an 
age of “staggering civic illiteracy” and the law should guide citizens to the 
                                                                                                                 
  91 Patel v. Tex. Dept. of Licensing and Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 69, 92–93 (Tex. 
2015) (Willett, J., concurring). 
  92 Id. at 93. 
  93 Id. 
  94 Id. at 101–02. 
  95 Id. at 101.  
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“essential condition of human flourishing” because our laws “enshrine a 
promise (liberty), not merely a process (democracy).”96 The latter contention 
reflects a principle that there is a repository of justice apart from positive law, 
while the former posits a doubt that today’s citizens are attuned to such a 
standard. In a sense, Judge Willett is using his position on the bench to educate 
the citizenry in universal principles, principles grounded in canonical 
literature.  
Judge Willett is not unique in either his evocation of natural law or his 
citation of literature from the Western canon. Indeed, Judge Wilkin in the mid-
twentieth century declared: 
The principles, standards, and precepts of Natural Law are continually 
employed by courts as the constitutions, statutes, and precedents are 
interpreted and applied to the ever-varying circumstances of life. They are 
employed also in the interpretation of wills, contracts, conduct and 
relationships of life. They are part of man’s nature and cannot be separated 
from his life.97 
Although most judges with a natural law bent are not as candid, Judge 
Wilkin’s account shows how a judge’s worldview can be defined by natural 
law jurisprudence.  
Accordingly, it should be no surprise that nearly half of literary citations 
used in judicial opinions appear in cases about constitutional rights and that 
the majority of such citations appear in dissents.98 Employing literature to 
defend the concept of guaranteed rights allows judges to explain their position 
with an external authority; citing a canonical text allows a judge to bolster a 
judicial opinion with the wisdom of a writer believed to be a keen observer of 
the human condition. Considering that rights are abstract principles that shield 
citizens from codified law, extralegal justifications are an apt mechanism for 
empowering rights.  
Take, for instance, Judge Reinhardt’s reliance on canonical depictions of 
assisted suicide to bolster his natural rights argument in Compassion in Dying 
v. Washington, which advocates for a moral right of assisted suicide for the 
terminally ill.99 In this case, Judge Reinhardt invokes Sophocles, Socrates, St. 
Augustine, Justinian, Cato, Shakespeare, Donne, and other canonical authors 
to explain the correctness of his suicide jurisprudence.100 In the same literary 
vein, Justice Brennan cites George Orwell in Florida v. Riley to advocate for 
enhanced Fourth Amendment rights against aerial surveillance. He writes:  
                                                                                                                 
  96 Patel, 469 S.W.3d at 92. 
  97 Note, Natural Law for Today’s Lawyer, 9 STAN. L. REV. 455, 494 (1957).  
  98 See Henderson, supra note 39, at 179–80. 
  99 Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 812 (9th Cir. 1996). 
  100 Id. at 806–10, 821 (9th Cir. 1996). 
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I hope it will be a matter of concern to my colleagues that the police 
surveillance methods they would sanction were among those described 40 
years ago in George Orwell’s dread vision of life in the 1980’s: “The black-
mustachio’d face gazed down from every commanding corner. There was one 
on the house front immediately opposite. BIG BROTHER IS WATCHING YOU, 
the caption said .  .  .  In the far distance a helicopter skimmed down between 
the roofs, hovered for an instant like a bluebottle, and darted away again with 
a curving flight. It was the Police Patrol, snooping into people’s windows.” 
Who can read this passage without a shudder, and without the instinctive 
reaction that it depicts life in some country other than ours? I respectfully 
dissent.101 
Indeed, canonical literary citation is particularly important in dissents, perhaps 
when a judge stakes a heterodox claim about a particular right. When literature 
informs judges, it does so about the fundamental questions about rights and 
operates unencumbered by positive law.  
Canonical literature is an effective vehicle for challenging existing laws 
that appear unjust or unreasonable and for delivering extralegal principles in 
an acceptable medium to citizens. Attributing a moral or legal claim to a 
canonical writer provides more credibility to a judge than simply announcing 
that the judge is making a judgment that conflicts with existing law. As such, 
Patel, along with the other judicial writings cited above, illuminates how 
natural law judicial opinions possess an affinity for the Western canon and 
may draw on the authority of the canon to explain concepts to readers or to 
inform judicial application of natural law.  
B. A Mix’d Essence: Natural Law and the Double Nature of Rhetoric 
and Formation in Judicial Opinions 
Crafting judicial opinions requires two separate processes.102 First, a judge 
must decide how to apply the law to a case.103 This formative step requires 
evaluating how to apply the law, codified or otherwise, to a given factual 
scenario. Second, the opinion must be crafted to explain the judge’s ruling.104 
This rhetorical stage is geared towards persuading legal readers and citizens of 
the correctness of the judge’s application of the law. If a judge wishes to use 
literature to justify natural law elements of his or her opinion, the process will 
be different depending on if this occurs at the formative step or the rhetorical 
stage.105  
This dual nature of judicial opinions leads to two competing views of the 
role of literary citations in natural judicial opinions. Either canonical literature 
                                                                                                                 
  101 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 466–67 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
  102 Karl S. Coplan, Legal Realism, Innate Morality, and the Structural Role of the 
Supreme Court in the U.S. Constitutional Democracy, 86 TUL. L. REV. 181, 185 (2011). 
  103 Id. 
  104 Id. 
  105 See id. at 185–95. 
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informs judicial opinions by providing access to eternal truths about the 
human condition, providing a sort of natural law or information about the 
natural law, or judges use literature in support of a natural rights position, 
meaning literature simply explains what the judge already knows.106 This 
latter function touches upon the legal realist criticism of natural law as merely 
a guise for political preferences, i.e., that judges may dress up their preferences 
in the clothing of eternal, objective truths but in reality this is simply a strategy 
to further their own political preferences.107 If literature is to have a 
substantive impact on judicial opinions, as opposed to merely providing 
rhetorical ornamentation, it cannot simply function to render judicial holdings 
digestible to the public. While such usage might alleviate the authority 
problem for natural law-oriented judicial opinions, it could not explain why 
judges find literature instructive. For instance, a judge who only uses literary 
citations to authorize her preexisting beliefs cannot be substantively influenced 
by the literary citation.  
 While judicial citations to canonical works may be helpful in persuading 
the general public that a judge’s defense of natural law or natural rights is 
rooted in wisdom concerning the human condition, this explanation does not 
sufficiently establish the substantive function of literary citations. When 
judges claim that canonical literature informs their opinions about legal rights 
or shapes their world-view, it seems overly cynical to dismiss these statements 
as puffery or mendacity. Considering federal judges are unelected, the motive 
for judges to lie about the role of literature in their opinions is minimal. 
Furthermore, when judges cite literature in their opinions, that “literature 
becomes woven into the fabric of the law” because the concepts from the cited 
literary work gain precedential value, or at least function as instructive dicta to 
legal scholars, practitioners, and readers.108 Indeed, the Tenth Circuit in Lesley 
v. Oklahoma found that it could not separate the “fiction” of Hugo’s Les 
Miserables and the “facts” of the case at hand, because “the human equation 
runs through it all.”109 In short, the court in Lesley drew on Hugo’s objective 
standard of what human beings would consider justice to require in a given 
fact pattern. When a legal or moral standard comes from a canonical literary 
work, it functions like a natural law, providing a judge an external standard for 
deciding what is the just and proper resolution of a legal dispute. Therefore 
                                                                                                                 
  106 See id. at 188–90. 
  107 See id. at 182–83 (describing the legal realism perspective that “rather than 
declaring what the law is, courts declare ‘law,’ making policy choices in the process. These 
policy choices are informed more by each individual jurist’s background and sense of 
fairness than by formal reasoning from legal rules.” This runs counter to both natural law 
arguments and recent “psychological research [that] has posited that a sense of fairness and 
justice may be innate and evolved in human nature[.]”).  
  108 John M. DeStefano III, On Literature as Legal Authority, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 521, 
529 (2007). 
  109 Lesley v. Oklahoma, 407 F.2d 543, 547 (10th Cir. 1969).  
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literary citations should be viewed as legally significant in judicial opinions, at 
least when judges tell us that literature was instructive in the holding.110  
C. More Things in Heaven and Earth / Than Are Dreamt of in Your 
Philosophy: How Canonical Literature Addresses the Authority 
Problem in a Secular Era 
The Western canon functions in a similar manner to religion in cultivating 
a belief in transcendent or eternal standards that exist outside positive law.111 
As American society has become increasingly pluralist, it is more difficult to 
rely on a singular corpus of knowledge when attempting to create a dialogue 
with or between citizens.112 Unlike the Founding Era, when Americans shared 
a worldview shaped by Protestant theology, today’s society is not a monad 
when it comes to religious, intellectual, or cultural authority.113 Even though 
the Western canon remains entrenched in the American intellectual psyche, 
many scholars reject the canon because it fails to reflect or represent American 
society at large.114 Using substantive references to the Western canon in the 
twenty-first century poses more difficulties for judges than invoking the 
religion-based natural law of the past.  
The secularization of American society, and the concomitant cynicism 
towards eternal standards, makes it difficult for a judge to openly ground his or 
her opinion in natural law. Even assuming that a judge could access natural 
law through reason or revelation, it would be exceedingly difficult to convince 
legislators and citizens of self-evident truths, particularly self-evident truths 
not already enshrined in our legal or political system. Considering that 
“literature can create meaning and an emotional response in ways 
unachievable by other citations,”115 it is no surprise that judges use literary 
citations to make heterodox legal arguments, i.e., arguments that reject legal 
positivism in favor of natural law or natural rights. 
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22 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL Furthermore 
As demonstrated above, judges may employ canonical literature as an 
external authority that guides their decisions. This move requires a tacit 
acknowledgement that the moral insights of literature can surmount positive, 
codified law.116 Similar to religion in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
the Western canon provides a standard that judges may recognize for 
evaluating the rightness or wrongness of the parties before them that is not 
wholly dependent on statutes and constitutions. Indeed, the term canon 
originated as a biblical concept describing the genuine scripts of texture that 
represent God’s word.117 Because both religion and canonical literature 
provide “views about the ‘ultimate’ questions,”118 it should not come as a 
surprise that judges rely on the Western canon to uphold extralegal natural 
rights in an era where religion is no longer a uniformly accepted authority.  
V. COME YOU SPIRITS, UNSEX ME HERE: CONSIDERING THE CRITICAL 
RACE AND GENDER CRITIQUE OF THE WESTERN CANON AS HARMFULLY 
EXCLUSIONARY 
Although the Western canon has traditionally been a commonly accepted 
source of wisdom about the human condition, recent movements in the 
academy have questioned the neutrality of the canon.119 From this critical 
perspective, the canon does not offer enduring or eternal insight about the 
human condition, but is instead a mechanism of enshrining interests of the 
dominant class or race. Most authors comprising the Western canon are 
undeniably white, male, European or of European dissent, heterosexual, 
cisgender and, to some extent, upper-class.120 This observation invites the 
critique of an exclusionary Western canon dismissive of views that are not 
historically privileged and useful as a political tool for maintaining the status 
quo under the guise of neutral and objective wisdom.121  
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The American legal system and judiciary are not immune to these 
critiques; critical race theory and feminist legal theory contend that Western 
institutions function to perpetuate oppression of racial minorities, working and 
lower-class individuals, and non-males. For instance, a minority citizen 
employing critical race theory may be skeptical that “[a court] considers and 
speaks to a community in which she is included” when it issues an opinion 
binding that community.122 Similarly, feminist scholars work to “uncover male 
bias and male norms in rules, standard, and concepts that appear to neutral or 
objective on their face.”123 Feminist scholars may be especially critical of the 
Western canon and the natural law tradition because of their opposition to “the 
temptation to speak in universal terms, a habit feminists detest in male-
oriented scholarship and language.”124 As a particular class, race, or gender 
might assert universal terms to establish or entrench favorable power 
dynamics, the existence of a canon rightly creates skepticism that the contents 
of the canon may further a political agenda.  
While many canonical works were penned in eras hostile to certain races, 
genders, and socioeconomic groups, this does not mean the Western canon is 
doomed or unavailing in a pluralist society. If the current literary canon is not 
persuasive to American citizens, it becomes ineffective in solving the authority 
problem for natural law judicial opinions.125 The current critique that the 
Western canon is not equally accessible to or representative of all citizens, 
thereby engendering iniquity as opposed to universal knowledge, jeopardizes 
the validity of judicial opinions that rely on the substance of canonical texts.126 
A canon that serves the interests of the entrenched class certainly cannot be a 
guide for justice.127 This likely means that natural law judges must evolve in 
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their citations of canonical literature or else the Western canon may suffer a 
similar diminishment in authority as American religion. This evolution could 
unfold in two ways; either society will recalibrate its conception of what is 
canonical or judges will select canonical principles that survive scrutiny when 
inspected for racism, sexism, classism, and all other bugaboos of 
contemporary American politics.  
Fortunately, the canon is not impermeable. Authors regularly phase in and 
out of the canon. For instance, twentieth century African American female 
authors like Zora Neale Hurston, Zadie Smith, Toni Morrison, and Nella 
Larsen entered the canon by gaining acclaim in the academy.128 The Eleventh 
Circuit not only cited Toni Morrison in a recent decision, but cited a passage 
in Beloved critical of the societal status quo.129 As our society recognizes 
traditionally marginalized voices as being keen observers of the human 
condition, perhaps the Western canon will begin to reflect our contemporary 
values.  
Even without substantial addition of minority viewpoints or reduction of 
white male authors, the traditional Western canonical works may be 
interpreted as “value-shattering and forward-looking sources for a just 
society.”130 Weisburg argues that the Western canon not only “feature[s] 
numerous works of women, minorities, and culturally diverse writers” but also 
“contains within it the seeds of a radical departure for Western culture[.]”131 
This phenomenon occurs because the ideas in the Western canon “inform their 
own iconoclasm.”132 Otherwise stated, Shakespeare’s gender bending, Camus’ 
existentialism, Homer’s timeless depiction of heroic virtue, and Flaubert’s 
condemnation of bourgeois pettiness belong to no race, gender, or creed. 
Indeed, the conception of justice that inspired Americans to view racism, 
sexism, and classism as evils originated in minds educated by our culture’s 
indelible texts.133 So long as insightfulness is the main criterion of the canon, 
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Spring 2018] SOUNDING THE CANON 25 
judges may still identify guiding principles and morals from canonical texts 
without excluding historically marginalized groups.134 
Cynics of judicial impartiality would likely scoff at the notion that the 
Western canon is politically neutral, particularly in the current era of identity 
politics. Henry Louis Gates Jr. succinctly summarized this view in The New 
York Times, wryly observing, “Pay no attention to the men behind the curtain, 
booms the Great Oz of literary history.”135 This critique is bolstered when 
noting that the slow evolution of the Western canon is likely outdone in 
sluggishness only by the judicial appetite to adopt new trends or rights.136 
However, the universality that attracts natural law judges to the Western canon 
could prove appealing to an American populace desperate for unity in an era of 
division. If judicial opinions like Patel are to be believed, there is an objective 
standard of right and wrong that applies even as new and diverse voices gain 
prominence in America. So long as the canon adjusts accordingly or judges 
properly question principles drawn from the canon, there is still hope that the 
morality and rationality traditionally associated with canonical thinkers will 
remain accessible in the twenty-first century. That would indeed be a 
jurisprudential happily ever after.  
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